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ABSTRACT
Proponents of trade liberalization argue that it will force firms to produce closer to the production
possibility frontier and that the frontier will move out faster. In particular, plants that export will
achieve a higher productivity level. However intuitive the argument, empirical evidence is meager.
This hypothesis is examined by calculating the effect of export status on productivity for a panel of
manufacturing plants in nine African countries. The results indicate that exporters in these countries
are more productive, replicating a similar finding for developed countries. More importantly,
exporters increase their productivity advantage after entry into the export market. While the first
finding can be explained by selection---only the most productive firms engage in exporting---the
latter cannot. The results are robust when unobserved productivity differences and self-selection into
the export market are controlled for using different econometric methods. Scale economies are
shown to be an important channel for the productivity advance. Credit constraints and contract
enforcement problems prevent plants that only produce for the domestic market to fully exploit scale
economies.
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It is a well established fact that plants that face foreign competition or have to satisfy demand-
ing foreign customers are forced to adapt. Previous studies have invariably found exporters
to diﬀer substantially from nonexporters and I conﬁrm that ﬁnding for plants in sub-Saharan
Africa. While most authors have explained the diﬀerences by self-selection—only the most
productive plants choose to start exporting—I ﬁnd evidence for learning-by-exporting as well.
Even though exporters are more productive than other plants before they start selling abroad,
they manage to increase this productivity advantage following their entry into the export mar-
ket. Exposure to foreign competition or interaction with foreign clients seems to confer some
beneﬁts. More formally, the production function depends positively on lagged export status
and the eﬀect remains after controlling for the endogenous nature of the export participa-
tion decision. I establish and show the robustness of this ﬁnding using diﬀerent econometric
methodologies, which yield qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar results. It
is important to note that each methodology favored the self-selection over the learning-by-
exporting explanation for the positive correlation between productivity and export status
when applied to data from other countries.
Opening up to trade is often advocated as a way of stimulating the economy, especially in
developing countries. It is an integral part of most IMF and World Bank structural reform
programs. Some authors have studied the competitive eﬀects of increased import penetra-
tion. For example, Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Tybout and Westbrook (1995) demonstrate
that increased competition from imports lowers the price-cost margin. The coarse industry
classiﬁcation in the African data set I use, makes it impossible to identify plants that face
competition from increased import penetration. Other authors have emphasized the posi-
1tive eﬀect on aggregate productivity from resource reallocation following trade liberalization.
Pavcnik (2002) presents evidence of this process for Chile. Bernard and Jensen (1999b) show
for the United States that the reallocation of output share to more productive exporters im-
proves aggregate productivity. Moreover, increased foreign competition leads to closures of
less productive plants or induces plants to shift industry, with similar aggregate productivity
eﬀects, see Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2002). To make a convincing case for such eﬀects,
one needs to observe the universe of plants, which I don’t.
Instead, I investigate the link between trade openness and productivity by looking at pro-
ductivity diﬀerences for exporters over nonexporters. The example of export-led growth in
East Asia underscores the potential for economic development through trade. Plants can ben-
eﬁt from their exporting activities if they learn about and adopt international best practice
production methods, receive feedback from international clients and competitors, or beneﬁt
from other knowledge spillovers or externalities. Theoretical models by Krugman (1979) and
Jovanovic and Lach (1991) incorporate such mechanisms. Alternatively, plants can improve
their product oﬀerings by interacting with foreign clients. Fafchamps, El Hamine, and Zeufack
(2002) ﬁnd evidence for this type of market learning in Morocco.
The countries and plants that I study are introduced in Section 2, where I also show that
the simple correlation between productivity and export status holds in Africa, at all levels
of aggregation. In Section 3, I conﬁrm the widely established fact that exporters diﬀer in
important ways from nonexporters. They pay higher wages, operate at a higher scale, produce
with more capital, and have higher productivity. The diﬀerences are remarkably similar to
those reported for other countries. An important point of departure from previous studies is
the widening of the gaps after plants enter the export market. This is illustrated by focusing
on diﬀerent points of a plant’s export cycle and on growth rates pre and post export market
2entry.
Section 4 contains a more thorough investigation of the central question of the paper: Is
the productivity advantage of exporters already established before plants enter the export
market or is it increased further post-entry? Using a variety of econometric methods and data
from several countries, Bernard and Jensen (1999a), Isgut (2001), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout
(1998), and Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano (2002) concluded in favor of the self-selection and
against the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Only the most productive ﬁrms are able to
compete internationally or have a suﬃcient cost advantage to overcome transportation costs.
Exporters are more productive than nonexporters, not because there are any beneﬁts associ-
ated with export activities, but they are simply more productive from the outset. Only a few
studies—Kraay (1999), Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller (2002), and Bigsten et al. (2000a)—
reach the opposite conclusion. Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) ﬁnd evidence supporting
learning-by-exporting in Taiwan, but not in South Korea. I review the diﬀerent methodolo-
gies and the arguments supporting causality conclusions with the corresponding results for
the African plants in Section 4.
For African exporters, the evidence points to the learning mechanism as partial explanation.
Three diﬀerent methodologies that concluded in favor of the alternative hypothesis (self-
selection by exporters) for other countries and one new approach are used to support this
conclusion. In Section 3, the time dimension of the panel is exploited to demonstrate that the
diﬀerences between exporters and nonexporters widen after entry into the export market. A
positive eﬀect of lagged export status on productivity remains after controlling for self-selection
and the endogeneity of productivity in the ﬁrm’s input choices. This is established using
instrumental variables, in Section 4.1, by jointly estimating the model of export participation
developed in Roberts and Tybout (1997) with the production function, in Section 4.2, and
3using semi-parametric techniques drawing on work by Olley and Pakes (1996), in Section 4.3.
If there is one place one can expect ﬁrms to beneﬁt from foreign activities, it is sub-Saharan
Africa. The domestic market in all countries is small and foreign sales are a prerequisite to
fully exploit scale economies. In Section 5, I show that approximately 50% of the productivity
premium attributed to exporters results from the higher scale of operation. Nonexporters
have more diﬃculties exploiting scale economies because of widespread contractual problems
and lack of credit. Domestic clients frequently postpone or default on payments. Sales to for-
eign clients or to multinational companies are less likely to generate such problems. Finally,
the production technology employed in most African ﬁrms is lagging best practice consider-
ably, providing ample scope for productivity improvements through imitation and adoption
of foreign technology. Tests for a structural break in the sample supports the conclusion that
exporters produce with a diﬀerent technology than nonexporters.
2 Countries, plants and exports in Africa
Literature: The evidence on links between productivity and export status in Africa is rela-
tively meager. Given the amount of protection that still exists and the high dispersion of
productivity, the potential beneﬁts of liberalization could be substantial. A few studies inves-
tigated trade eﬀects on productivity at the plant-level data. For Cote d’Ivoire, Harrison (1994)
ﬁnds that foreign-owned plants improve productivity following trade liberalization, while the
eﬀects on domestic plants are negative, but insigniﬁcant. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998)
do not ﬁnd any impact of lagged export status on costs for Morocco. They conclude that the
correlation between export status and productivity is caused by self-selection. For Cameroon,
Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, Bigsten et al. (2000a) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of exporting on
4productivity and on productivity growth even after accounting for self-selection and ﬁrm het-
erogeneity. Kraay (1999) pioneered the methodology and found a positive eﬀect of lagged
exports on productivity for Chinese ﬁrms as well. Given that these are the only two studies
to ﬁnd evidence for learning-by-exporting, a robustness check is warranted.1
Countries: The sub-Saharan African countries I study are Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All nine are low-income countries
with a level of development varying from a GDP per capita of $446 in Ethiopia (in current
PPP in 1995) to $2195 in Zimbabwe. Some summary statistics on the countries are in Table
A.1 in the Appendix. Value added per employee in industry is substantially higher, even con-
verted using actual exchange rates.2 The share of manufacturing in GDP is relatively small
in each country, but it exceeds employment in the sector by a large margin. A fair estimate
is that manufacturing workers are 2 to 3 times more productive than the average worker.
The share of manufacturing output that is exported ranges from 6% in Burundi to 60% in
Cote d’Ivoire, averaging 29% across countries. Most trade is overseas, as trade ﬂows within
the region are small. Europe is an important trading partner for all countries, while Japan, the
United States and the Middle East are important for some countries. The last column in Table
A.1 shows that the share of manufactured products in total exports averages 23%. Only in
Burundi and Zambia is it smaller than the manufacturing share in GDP. It is true, nevertheless,
that exports are very concentrated. In all countries but Zimbabwe, one agriculture or mining
product accounts for more than 50% of all exports. Given that half of all gross ﬁxed domestic
investment is made up of imported capital goods, it is vital for these countries to diversify
1Tybout (2000) raises some concerns regarding their approach, see footnote 56. Another concern is that
they force all industries in all countries to operate with the same production technology. The data for this
paper includes their plants, but adds plants from ﬁve additional countries. A recent working paper by Girma,
Greenaway, and Kneller (2002) also ﬁnds evidence for the learning hypothesis in the U.K. using a matching
estimator.
2Comparable employment statistics are only available for industry (which also includes mining and utilities).
5the sources of foreign exchange revenues.3 The obvious solution is to expand manufacturing
exports. Over the last two decades this has been happening most successfully in Zambia,
Cameroon, and Zimbabwe.
Another indication of the importance of manufacturing exports—and the subject of the
remainder of the analysis—is the positive correlation between productivity and export market
activity. In Table 1, this is shown to hold at each level of aggregation. Countries, industries,
or plants that are more prone to exporting also have a higher level of labor productivity. Of
course, this merely establishes a correlation and does not say anything about causality.
Plants: The sample of manufacturing plants is constructed from ﬁrm surveys, carried out
between 1992 and 1996. In each country approximately 200 ﬁrms were interviewed in three
consecutive years.4 The data collection was coordinated by the Regional Program on En-
terprise Development at the World Bank. Firms were sampled from four broadly deﬁned
manufacturing sectors: food, textile and clothing, wood and furniture, metal and equipment.
The sampling was stratiﬁed by plant-size to give each manufacturing employee equal proba-
bility to be included. For more information on the plants and the sampling scheme, see Van
Biesebroeck (2002). Total value added for the plants included in the sample accounts for
almost 40% of manufacturing GDP in the nine countries combined.5
To estimate productivity one needs to observe output and inputs. Most of the analysis
uses value added as output, measured as total sales minus raw materials and intermediate
3In the poorest four countries, the average dependency of domestic investment on imported capital rises to
67%.
4In Cote d’Ivoire only two rounds of interviews were completed and in Burundi and Ethiopia only one.
Some ﬁrms exit the sample and others were added in later rounds to maintain the sample size. Some of the
sample attrition is the result of economic factors, e.g. bankruptcy, but an equally important reason for a ﬁrm
to leave the sample is non-economic. Firms moved or did not want to cooperate anymore. Initially, I ignore
entry and exit, but I control for it explicitly when investigating the robustness of the ﬁndings.
5Because employees at large plants produce more output than employees working at smaller plants, the
share of the manufacturing workforce represented by the sampled ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly smaller.
6inputs. Labor input is the total number of employees and capital is the replacement value of
the plant and equipment at the end of the year. GDP deﬂators from World Bank (2000) are
used to make output, materials, and capital comparable across years. The labor productivity
statistics in the last column of Table A.2 are employment weighted averages of plant-level value
added per employee. These numbers correspond reasonably well to the aggregate statistics
for industry in the second column of Table A.1. The oversampling of larger, more productive
plants explains the uniformly higher productivity numbers. The only diﬀerence in the relative
ranking of countries is the higher aggregate productivity for Zambia—caused by its large
copper mining industry—and Cote d’Ivoire—possibly the result of inadequate price deﬂators
following the huge devaluation in the CFA franc. The ﬁndings for these plants should reﬂect
the experiences of an important part of the manufacturing sector in the respective countries.
Participation on the export market varies tremendously across countries. Table A.3 con-
tains information on export participation, intensity, and destination for the sample of African
manufacturing plants. A number of stylized facts stand out. Participation rises almost mono-
tonically across countries with the level of development of the manufacturing sector. Larger
ﬁrms, those with more than 250 employees, are much more likely to engage in exporting. The
majority of exporters sell less than 20% of total sales abroad, but large ﬁrms tend to export
more. A sizeable share of exports, on average 41%, goes to overseas destinations.
The correlations in Table 1 already illustrated that exporters have higher labor produc-
tivity and that among exporters the dollar value of exports is also positively correlated with
productivity. The diﬀerences between exporters and nonexporters are investigated in more
detail in the following section.
73 Exporters are diﬀerent
A number of studies have documented that the diﬀerences between exporters and nonexporters
go beyond size. Regressing plant characteristics on an export dummy with controls is a popular
way to measure those diﬀerences.6 Bernard and Jensen (1995) were the ﬁrst to perform this
exercise for the United States. Bernard and Wagner (1997) did the same calculations for
Germany and Isgut (2001) for Colombia.7 Table 2 contains some of their main ﬁndings and a
column with comparable results for the African plants.
The qualitative ﬁndings are identical in each of the four countries (region in the case of
Africa). Exporters pay higher wages, produce more output per worker, produce more capital-
intensively, sustained by a similarly increased investment rate, and operate at a larger scale.
Quantitatively, the coeﬃcients on the export dummy for Africa exceed those of the comparison
countries, especially the more developed ones. Most of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1
percent signiﬁcance level, even though the African sample is substantially smaller than in the
other studies.
The coeﬃcients on the export dummy are also large in an economic sense. Even after
controlling for size, exporters pay on average 34% higher wages. The pay diﬀerential is solely
due to remuneration of nonproduction workers, as was the case in Germany.8 Exporters
produce an extra 50% output per worker, in value added or total sales. The diﬀerence can be
the result of higher production, but can also stem from higher quality, and more expensive,
products. The largest diﬀerence between the two types of plants is in the scale of operation.
6Controls include country speciﬁc time dummies, sector and location dummies, and the logarithm of em-
ployment to control for size (except in the last two regressions).
7Results for the United Kingdom in Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller (2002) are very similar to those for
the United States and Germany and are omitted here.
8Production and nonproduction workers can only be distinguished in a subset of the sample.
8African exporters produce on average 300% more output and they employ three times as many
workers. In the United States and Germany exporters are only twice as large as nonexporters.
The enormous size diﬀerential is less surprising in less developed countries, where the domestic
market for manufactures is small. Most of the estimated size diﬀerentials for Colombia are
similar to those for the African countries.9
The previous results establish that African exporters diﬀer substantially from other plants,
with invariably larger diﬀerentials than other countries. It makes this sample a promising
place to ﬁnd learning-by-exporting eﬀects. Exploiting the time dimension of the panel data
set I can go one step further. If changes in export status are observed, the eﬀect of the export
activity can be isolated by comparing productivity before and after. The question is whether
the diﬀerences between exporters and nonexporters already existed before exporters started
exporting and whether diﬀerences outlast exit from the export market. Of the 900 plant-years
with positive exports (23% of the sample), 128 observations are plants that just entered the
export market. 103 plants stop exporting before the end of the sample period.
I extend the regression results from Table 2 by including a full set of dummies describing
the entire export experience of plants. The omitted category are plants that never export.
The pre-export dummy distinguishes plants that only start exporting later in the sample from
perennial nonexporters. A similar post-export dummy identiﬁes previous exporters after their
exit from the export market. Three more dummies are turned on for plants in years that
are actively exporting. Plants are classiﬁed as “newly entered” or “about to quit” if they
start or stop exporting during the sample period. As “continuous exporters” if they export
9Including the share of sales that is exported as explanatory variable, only produces a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
in the last two regressions, that measure the size diﬀerential (estimates are omitted). Larger plants tend to
export a higher share of their output. The small size of the manufacturing sector in African economies makes
this almost unavoidable.
9throughout.
The results of the regressions are presented concisely in the tree panels of Figure 1. The
ﬁrst thing to note is that each and every line is above the X-axis.10 Plants that are active on
the export market at any point in time, pay higher salaries, produce more output per worker,
and operate with more capital and at larger scale at every point in time, even when they are
not exporting. This is consistent with the selection and the learning hypothesis.
The top panel displays the pattern over the export-cycle for the two size variables, sales and
employment. Some of the size diﬀerential already exists before entry in the export market,
it increase slightly with entry, grows tremendously for plants active on the export market for
a longer time, and tends to reduce leading up and following exit from the export market.
The middle panel shows a similar pattern for the two labor productivity and wage variables.
Diﬀerences increase while exporting and decrease before and after exit from the export market.
The only diﬀerences are the larger jumps on initial entry, at least relatively, and ﬁrms that
have been exporting for a longer time are not distinguishable from new exporters. In the
bottom panel, for investment and capital per worker, the initial jump for new exporters is
even larger, and the evolution prior to exit is diﬀerent.
The pattern of gradually increasing diﬀerentials when plants start exporting and decreases
when they stop are supportive of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. In particular, for every
characteristic considered the diﬀerence between active exporters and nonexporters is larger
than the diﬀerences prior to entry on the export market. In addition, diﬀerentials decrease
prior to exit from the export market and decrease further (except for capital) post-exit. Few
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant, but the pattern is very consistent. Even though many diﬀerences
10The full regression results are in Table B.1 in the Appendix. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, except for three dummies in the investment per worker regression.
10are large in an economic sense, a longer or larger sample would be needed to ﬁnd stronger
results.
Equality of the coeﬃcients can be tested pairwise or jointly, see Table B.1. From the tests
I can conclude that (a) exporters always diﬀer from perennial nonexporters; (b) continuous
exporters are larger than any other group of plants; (c) intermittent exporters have signiﬁ-
cantly lower labor productivity than continuous exporters before or after their export spells,
but hardly lower productivity when they are actively exporting (p-values of 0.22 and 0.28);
(d) plants primarily increase their capital intensity at the start of export spells.
An alternative strategy is to look at correlations between growth rates and export status.
While plants might self-select into the export market based on their productivity level, this
is much less likely for productivity growth. This intuition is borne out by the data. First,
I regress the growth rates on a dummy indicating whether the plant is ever an exporter.
Most coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst row of Table 3 are positive, but only the value added per worker
regression reveals a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Over their entire export-cycle, exporters do not enjoy
consistently higher growth rates than perennial nonexporters. The results are very diﬀerent
when I regress the same growth rates on a dummy for current export activity. In this case,
every single coeﬃcient is positive. The eﬀects are very large and highly signiﬁcant for the labor
productivity and size variables. The higher growth rates are not simply ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, given
the results in the ﬁrst row, but are associated with actual export activity.
Including two dummies, one for current and one for past or future export activity, conﬁrms
this ﬁnding. All coeﬃcients in the last row of Table 3 are negative. Exporters that are currently
not active on the export market have lower growth rates than perennial nonexporters. When
they are actively exporting the diﬀerences are again positive (except for wage growth) and
very large, between 3.5% and 16.3%. Exporters are able to improve productivity, capital
11intensity and size, but only when they are actively exporting, not ex ante or ex post. 11 I
interpret this as further corroborating evidence on the learning-by-exporting hypothesis: only
during export spells do plants grow faster.
Given that the goal is to establish a link between productivity and exporting, one would
like to go beyond labor productivity. Exporters produce more output per worker, but to some
extent this is simply the result of capital deepening. Often the analysis proceeds in two steps.
First, productivity is estimated using index numbers (TFP) or econometrically. Subsequently,
productivity estimates are regressed on a set of dummy variables, characterizing the export
history of a plant. Bernard and Jensen (1999a) and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) adopt
this approach with TFP estimates for the United States, Taiwan, and South Korea. They
ﬁnd that the productivity gap between exporters and nonexporters opens up almost entirely
in the years prior to entry in the export market. The gap hardly increases after entry. They
conclude in favor of the selection and against the learning hypothesis.
TFP has the advantage that no estimation is required, but for the African plants a num-
ber of necessary assumptions are likely to be violated. For a subset of the African sample,
S¨ oderbom and Teal (2000) illustrate that ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes face diﬀerent factor prices and
they doubt that factor markets are competitive. Van Biesebroeck (2002) shows that returns to
scale are increasing and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Van
Biesebroeck (2003) illustrates that TFP is less robust to measurement error than econometric
productivity estimates, which is an additional concern for the African data set.
Estimating productivity econometrically is one solution, but the endogeneity of export
status will still cause trouble. If exporting improves productivity, it allows plants to produce
more output from the same inputs, shifting the production frontier out. In the two-step
11I did not include results with separate pre and post export dummies, because few coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
12approach, output is ﬁrst regressed on inputs, from which a productivity measure is calculated.
If export status is correlated with inputs, which was clearly shown to be the case in the
previous section, omitting the export dummy from the production function regression yields
inconsistent input coeﬃcient and productivity estimates. The straightforward solution is to
fold the two steps into one and include the export dummy directly in the production function.12





jt with Ajt = eαxEXjt−τ + ωcit + ωjt + jt. (1)
The productivity term Ajt, is a function of export activity (EXjt), aggregate productivity
growth for the country-industry (ωcit), unobserved plant-level productivity (ωjt), and random
measurement error or a transitory productivity shock (it). While ωjt is known to the plant
and it conditions its input choices or export decision on it, this is not the case for jt. The
input coeﬃcients vary across country, but I only report the average estimates.13 For the
moment, I estimate equation (1) using random eﬀects, allowing for correlation of unobserved
productivity over time within units, but not controlling for correlation with input or export
choices. In the next section, I will control explicitly for both endogeneity problems.
Results in the ﬁrst and third column of Table 4 conﬁrm the ﬁndings from Table 2. In the
full sample of nine countries, exporters are on average 28% more productive. Limiting the
sample to plants that are interviewed at least twice (only those are included when endogeneity
problems are controlled for in the next section), this rises to a 37% productivity advantage.
12Aitken and Harrison (1999) follow the same approach to estimate productivity eﬀects of FDI. Clerides,
Lach, and Tybout (1998) avoid the estimation of productivity altogether, using observable cost data, and look
for a link between average variable costs and export status.
13Estimating the production function with input coeﬃcients that also vary by industry did not yield any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences (results are omitted).
13These percentages overstate the learning-by-exporting eﬀect for several reasons. The export
dummy picks up the self-selection eﬀect, because export participation is endogenously deter-
mined. Using lagged exports partially remedies this eﬀect and it reduces the productivity
advantages by a third to 22%, in the ﬁfth column. To the extent that export participation
is correlated over time, this is only a partial ﬁx. One mechanism that generates such persis-
tency is the existence of sunk costs of exporting, see for example Roberts and Tybout (1997).
Alternative solutions are considered in the next section.
The dependency of input choices on productivity might contribute to the upward bias in the
export coeﬃcient. Under fairly general assumptions, the labor coeﬃcient will be aﬀected more
severely and be biased upward with a corresponding downward bias in the capital coeﬃcient,
see Olley and Pakes (1996). Given that exporters are more capital-intensive, it is likely to
induce an overestimate of the export eﬀect. Three diﬀerent solutions are proposed in the next
section. One of the methods I use, GMM-SYS, relies on two lags, which forces me to drop
plants from Cote d’Ivoire as well. For comparability, I included the estimates for six countries
in the last column. Lagged export status is still associated with higher productivity levels,
18% higher in this case.
Including a full set of dummies characterizing the entire export history of plants generates
results very similar to those in Figure 1. Productivity of future exporters already exceeds
that of nonexporters by a large margin even before they enter the export market, evidence of
self-selection. When exporting starts, the diﬀerence increases and it is even larger for plants
that have been exporting for a longer time, evidence of learning-by-exporting. Leading up to
exit from the export market productivity decreases and this continues after the actual exit.
As before, few diﬀerence are statistically signiﬁcant, but the pattern is remarkably similar.
The before-after identiﬁcation strategy provides evidence supporting both the self-selection
14and learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Future exporters are already more productive, operate
with more capital, and are larger in size than nonexporters before they start exporting. This
is not the end of the story. Comparing exporters during export spells and in years that they
do not export, consistently shows higher productivity levels and higher productivity growth
associated with the export activity. Using a similar identiﬁcation strategy, Bernard and Jensen
(1999a) only found evidence pointing towards self-selection in the United States and likewise
for Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) for South Korea.
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) used two diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies—exogeneity
assumptions on lagged inputs and augmenting the model of production with an export partic-
ipation equation—to ﬁnd support only for the self-selection hypothesis. In the next section, I
adapt both of their methods and a fourth semiparametric approach, to control for unobserved
productivity diﬀerences and self-selection. This last method has the added beneﬁt of control-
ling for exit. For the African plants, all methods support the existence of learning-by-exporting
eﬀects.
4 Learning-by-exporting controlling for self-selection
4.1 Instrumental variables: GMM-SYS
Because the export status of ﬁrms is not randomly assigned, one should control for it. If
conditioning on observables is suﬃcient to control for selection, it suﬃces to regress produc-
tivity on EXjt−1 include those variables, as in Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Bernard
and Jensen (1999a), and Bigsten et al. (2000a), or simply include those variables directly in
15the production function (1).14 Alternatively, one can control for selection using instrumental
variables, which requires weaker assumptions. Only the instruments need to be independent
of the unobserved productivity, while before the export status itself had to be conditionally
independent. Similar arguments are used to control for the simultaneity of input choices and
unobserved productivity.
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) estimate a variant of equation (1) using a generalized
method of moments estimator. They do not control for the potential simultaneity of (lagged)
exports and unobserved productivity, but note that the variance of the unobserved productiv-
ity was estimated very small in their maximum likelihood estimation. Neglecting self-selection
is likely to bias their ﬁndings towards ﬁnding learning eﬀects. The results they obtain using
the GMM estimator are hardly more supportive of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis than
the ML results in Colombia, but they ﬁnd some positive eﬀects for a number of Moroccan
industries.
I estimate equation (1) using the GMM-SYS estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). Un-
observed productivity is assumed to evolve according to an autoregressive process
ωjt = ρωjt−1 + jt. |ρ| < 1
In its dynamic representation the production function in logarithms becomes
qjt = αx(EXjt−1 − ρEXjt−2) + αlc(ljt − ρljt−1) + αkc(kjt − ρkjt−1) + ρqjt−1
14The results in Bigsten et al. (2000a) still suﬀer from the two-stage omitted variable problem mentioned
earlier, because they ﬁrst estimate productivity econometrically. Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller (2002) use
the same idea in a matching estimator with data for the U.K. and they ﬁnd some support for the learning
hypothesis.











The GMM-SYS approach simultaneously estimates equation (2) in levels and in ﬁrst dif-
ferences. Twice lagged input and output variables ﬁgure as instruments in the diﬀerenced
equation and lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences are the instruments for the level equation. Estimating
both equations controls for the persistent part of unobserved productivity, without throwing
away the information contained in the levels. Because there are two lags, only data for six
countries can be used. In Table 5, I report results with and without enforcing the coeﬃ-
cient restrictions in the ﬁrst and fourth columns, respectively. Tests resoundingly reject the
coeﬃcient restrictions on lagged coeﬃcients and I will focus on the unrestricted results.
Exogeneity of the export status can be tested with a Durbin-Hausman speciﬁcation test.
The p-value for the test-statistic is 0.05 and I reject the exogeneity assumption. Four additional
variables are used as instruments for lagged export status: the location of the ﬁrm, ethnicity
of the owner, foreign ownership, and state ownership. The intuition is that ﬁrms located in
the capital will be more prone to exporting simply because transport infrastructure is better
developed. The ethnicity of the owner inﬂuences the extent of domestic and foreign contacts.
If the owner belongs to a domestic minority or speaks a foreign language, the ﬁrm is more
likely to export. Firms with some foreign ownership are, ceteris paribus, also more likely to
export. The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions is reported to asses the validity of
the instruments, assuming at least one variable is a proper instrument. When the coeﬃcient
restrictions are not enforced, in the fourth column, the validity of the instrument set is not
rejected.15 All coeﬃcient estimates and tests are reported in the ﬁrst and fourth column of
15With the restrictions enforced, the p-value for the Sargan test is much lower, but it does not decline when
export status (in addition to inputs) is treated as endogenous. The lagged variables, not the instruments for
export status, seem to be the weak instruments.
17Table 5 below.
4.2 Modeling export participation: MLE
The estimation method outlined in the previous section is fairly ﬂexible, but because of the
twice lagged instruments it can only use a limited sample. The result is a positive, but only
marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate on lagged export status. Another way of controlling
for the endogeneity of export market status is to model the participation decision explicitly and
jointly estimate it with the production function (1). This approach is more demanding in terms
of economic assumptions (and programming eﬀort), but generates more precise estimates.
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) pioneered this approach to evaluate the impact of exporting
on ﬁrms in Colombia and Morocco. They jointly estimate an average variable cost equation
and a selection rule for entry into the export market. Unobserved eﬀects that inﬂuence
exporting and productivity are incorporated and allowed to be correlated across equations.
They ﬁnd that lagged export status is not signiﬁcant in the cost function, while lagged costs
do predict export status. They conclude in favor of the self-selection hypothesis and against
learning-by-exporting.
Kraay (1999) and Bigsten et al. (2000a) estimate a similar model for China and four African
countries.16 While Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) use observable cost data as dependent
variable in the ﬁrst equation, these studies use an econometric estimate of productivity as
dependent variable. This risks introducing omitted variable bias, as discussed on page 13.
16Bigsten et al. (2000a) uses some of the same data as this paper, but limits the sample to only four
countries and uses a diﬀerent approach to calculate productivity. Their implementation makes the restrictive
assumption that all countries share the same production function. Another point of diﬀerence is that they
assume a discrete distribution for the unobservable eﬀects variables and estimate the three points of support,
instead of integrating out continuous random variables.




(αqτqjt−τ + αxτEXjt−τ) + αlcljt + αkckjt + ω1j + 1jt (2)
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jt + ω2j + 2jt ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(3)
The input coeﬃcients in the production function vary by country (c = 1...7). The four
dummy variables Z1 − Z4 are the exogenous determinants of export status that were used
as instruments in the previous section: location in the capital city, foreign ownership, ethnic
owner, state ownership. The right-hand side variable in the probit equation ˜ qjt−1 (and ˜ qjt−2)
is lagged productivity, calculated by rearranging equation (2), deducting all observable right-
hand side variables from qjt−1, and substituting in equation (3). Country-year and industry
are added to both equations. The short duration of the panel limits the number of lags I can
include to two (T ≤ 2).17 The remaining estimation issues are handled as in Clerides, Lach,
and Tybout (1998). Both error terms 1 and 2 are assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed.
The unobserved productivity terms ω1 and ω2 are integrated out using Gaussian quadrature,
allowing for correlation between both terms. Lagged equations are added to the system to
solve the initial values problem. They contain only the exogenous variables in the system and
nuisance parameters. For the full likelihood function, see Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1996).
Results are in the second and ﬁfth column of Table 5.
17Using two lags the sample is the same as for the GMM-SYS estimation. Including only a single lag in
output (productivity) and export status, allows the use of plants from Cote d’Ivoire as well.
194.3 Semiparametric estimation: OP
Finally, I adapt the semiparametric estimator developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) to control
for unobserved productivity and export status. A beneﬁt of this approach is the explicit
control for exit from the sample that is assumed to happen when productivity falls below a
threshold. In particular, Olley and Pakes (1996) argue that plants with more capital are likely
to wither greater reductions in productivity, making the exit threshold a decreasing function
of capital.18
Underlying the approach is an investment function, it = It(kt,at,ωt) which is monotonically
increasing in productivity (ω) for any given level of capital (k) and age (a). As a result, the
investment equation is invertible, producing an expression for productivity as an unknown
function of investment, capital, and age. In the ﬁrst estimation step, this expression is sub-
stituted in the production function and the coeﬃcient on labor (or any other variable input
coeﬃcient) is recovered using nonparametric techniques, controlling for the dependency on in-
vestment, capital, and age. In the second step, the survival probability of a plant is predicted,
using a nonparametric probit regression. In the third and ﬁnal step, coeﬃcients on the state
variables—capital and age—are recovered, using semiparametric nonlinear least squares.
For the current application, the investment function and survival probability will depend on
export status as well, while the dependency on plant age is ignored. Exporters might choose
a diﬀerent investment level and have a diﬀerent exit rule, even controlling for capital stock
and productivity, because of diﬀerent market prospects. Hence, I specify it = I0
t(kt,EXt,ωt)
and Prob(exit after period t) = Prob(ωt+1 ≤ ωt(kt,it,EXt). Given that both relationships
conditions on the observable export status, no new derivations are necessary. The investment
18Imperfections in the capital market or a proﬁt function that is increasing in capital—e.g. a constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function—will produce such a result.
20function is still monotonic in productivity even though the functional relationship is likely to
diﬀer for exporters and nonexporters. The nonparametric inversion is simply made export
status speciﬁc.19 The only diﬀerence with the Olley-Pakes estimator is to replace age by
export status in each step and to recover the coeﬃcient on lagged export status in the third
step.20 Even though export status does not evolve deterministically as is the case for age, it
remains quite general to assume that it evolves according to a Markov process as a function
of lagged productivity and lagged export status, which is what the theory requires. Results
with this approach are in the third and sixth column of Table 5.
4.4 Results
The results using each of the three estimation methods are in Table 5. In the ﬁrst three
columns, only one lag of export status and (where applicable) the dependent variable is
included. In the last three columns, two lags are included. For the GMM estimator, two
lags are always necessary, but in the ﬁrst column the coeﬃcient restrictions are enforced.
Country-year interactions and industry and location dummies are included as controls in each
equation, but not reported. Coeﬃcients on labor and capital vary by countries, as before, but
only the average estimate and standard error are reported.
The coeﬃcient estimates of virtually all export dummies are positive, although only sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero if a single lag is included. Engaging in exporting appears to
shifts the production function out by 20% to 38%, depending on the estimation method. The
19Even plants that change export status do not pose a problem, as the investment function will be increasing
in export status, see the evidence in Table 2, while at the same time plants with higher productivity are more
likely to start exporting, from the evidence on self-selection. Both eﬀects reinforce each other and will not
change the monotonic relationship between investment and productivity.
20Note that this adjusted Olley-Pakes method estimates the coeﬃcient of interest, the one on lagged export
status, in the third step. The nonparametric inversions in the ﬁrst two steps control for current export status.
21sign and magnitude of the export coeﬃcient estimates are plausible and supportive of the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Test for the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of exporting on
productivity, after controlling for self-selection, are rejected in the ﬁrst three and the ﬁfth
columns.21
Comparing the ﬁrst column in Table 5 with the last two columns in Table 4 produces the
counterintuitive result that the coeﬃcient on the export dummy jumps when export status
is treated as endogenous and instrumented. This is generally the case in the literature on
treatment eﬀects that uses instruments for identiﬁcation. If the eﬀect of treatment—engaging
in exporting—varies across plants, the point estimate of the treatment dummy will depend on
which observations drive the instrumental variables identiﬁcation.22 The positive correlation
between exporting and productivity, in Table 4, is partly explained by self-selection of more
productive plants. Some ﬁrms enter the export market because of high initial productivity,
without deriving any beneﬁt from that activity. The IV identiﬁcation strategy measures the
productivity eﬀect of exporting from ﬁrms that enter the export market for diﬀerent reasons.
Some ﬁrms export simply because they are located close to necessary transport infrastructure
or because the owner has family or business partners abroad, even though their productivity
level by itself would never warrant entry into the export market. These ﬁrms did not have
high initial productivity, but face the same foreign competition. They stand more of a change
21A longer sample could potentially provide stronger results. The only country for which more data (ﬁve
years in total) is available is Ghana. Unfortunately, this is also the country with the third lowest export
participation rate (second lowest for large ﬁrms), second lowest foreign sales intensity, and lowest overseas
sales of all countries. As a result, one would expect to ﬁnd the lowest learning-by-exporting eﬀects in Ghana.
In addition, the sample is relatively small in the fourth and ﬁfth year. 120 Ghanaian ﬁrms are observed in
each of the ﬁrst three waves, while only 44 extra ﬁrms are observed at least three times in the ﬁve year sample
period. Each of the four estimation methods produce results similar to those in Table 4 and 5. The lagged
export dummy is 0.23 (t-statistic of 1.33) using the random eﬀect panel data estimator; 0.26 (0.40) with the
GMM-SYS estimator; 0.29 (1.20) with the MLE; and 0.27 (1.02) with the Olley-Pakes estimator.
22In a similar econometric context, Card (2001) illustrates that when returns to schooling are estimated with
IV, individuals with low schooling or (unobserved) ability generally drive the identiﬁcation. These individuals
are likely to have higher returns to schooling, making the estimated return with IV invariably exceed the OLS
estimate.
22of beneﬁting from the foreign exposure and it is not implausible to ﬁnd a higher coeﬃcient
estimate for the export dummy. The instruments are constant over time for most plants and
fail to distinguish between the once and twice lagged eﬀects in the fourth column. Standard
errors are substantially larger if the restrictions are not enforced.
The second and ﬁfth column in Table 5 contain the results of joint estimation of the
production function and export participation decision with maximum likelihood. The latter
results are in Appendix B. Even though many coeﬃcients are still not estimated as precisely
as one would hope, most are now signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
The results lend support to both the self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypothesis. The
positive coeﬃcients on lagged productivity ( ˜ qt−j) in the export participation equation, see
Table B.2 in the Appendix, conﬁrm that more productive plants are more likely to enter the
export market. The signiﬁcant and large coeﬃcients on lagged export status in the same
equation indicate sunk costs of entry. Past export activity is one of the best predictors for
current export activity. The ethnicity and nationality of the ﬁrm owner have most predictive
power for the export status.
The positive coeﬃcients on the lagged export dummies in the production function point
to the presence of learning eﬀects. Previous activity on the export market raises current
output, even controlling for the selection eﬀect. The eﬀects are slightly larger than the GMM
estimate and become even stronger when two lags of export history are included. It takes
time for positive eﬀects to materialize. Firms that only exported last period are able to
produce 21% more output. If ﬁrms were exporting for both of the previous periods, the
productivity advancement increases to 55%, which is signiﬁcantly higher. If these eﬀects
seem (implausibly) large, one should keep in mind that the productivity dispersion in Africa
23exceeds similar measures for the U .S.23 The results in Table 5 also assume that all ﬁrms—
exporters and nonexporters—use a production technology with the same scale economies,
which are constant over the entire output range. In the next section, I investigate whether
exporters produce on a diﬀerent point on a more ﬂexible production frontier or with a diﬀerent
technology altogether.
The result with the semiparametric estimator, in the third and sixth column, conﬁrm the
ﬁndings. As expected, the labor coeﬃcient is estimated smaller than with the random eﬀects
estimator. The export coeﬃcient drops slightly from the random eﬀects estimate, 20% versus
22% previously, but remains in the same ballpark. It is still estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, although only when a single lag is included. Controlling for exit from the sample
did not have much impact on the results. Correlation between productivity and exit does not
seem to be a serious problem. Recall that the sample is not a census and that there are many
causes for ﬁrms to drop out.
All three identiﬁcation strategies that failed to ﬁnd learning-by-exporting eﬀects in other
countries point towards ﬁrms beneﬁting from previous export activity in Africa. A fourth
semiparametric method that controls for sample attrition and allows for a very ﬂexible evolu-
tion of unobserved productivity diﬀerences gives basically the same results, supportive of the
learning hypothesis. A natural next step is to question what is causing the higher productivity
that exporters enjoy. I investigate two potential beneﬁts, returns to scale and better contract
enforceability. Both eﬀects are likely to interact.
23Van Biesebroeck (2002) shows that the productivity ratio the 80th to the 20th percentile ﬁrm in the
diﬀerent African countries of the sample ranges from 4.1 in Zimbabwe to over 9 in Ethiopia, Ghana, and
Zambia. The comparable ratio for U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms was 2.75 in 1987.
245 Sources of productivity advantage
5.1 Returns to Scale
The most intuitive and straightforward beneﬁt for exporters is the ability to sell in a larger
market. The domestic market in each sample country is relatively small and returns to scale
are estimated to be increasing. In a survey of manufacturing in developing countries, Tybout
(2000) mentions that the potential scale economies in developing countries are smaller than
commonly expected. He cites, based on studies for Asia, Latin America and Northern Africa,
returns to scale between 1.05 and 1.10, which are slightly lower than the 1.10 to 1.15 estimates
I obtain in Africa, see Table 4. He is right to argue that such mild economies of scale are
unlikely to be the cause of the stalled development process, but proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms can
be expected to try to exploit them, for example by starting to export.
It was shown before that exporters are clearly larger and that the size gap increases with
entry into the export market. The size of the productivity advantage attributed to exporters
depends crucially on the assumption regarding returns to scale. If the production function
is estimated with constant returns to scale (CRS) enforced, the productivity advantage of
exporters increases substantially. The ﬁrst two columns in Table 6 shows an export advantage
of 45% under CRS, relative to 22% under VRS. Without economies of scale, the export dummy
absorbs some of the size eﬀect. Approximately half of the productivity advantage of exporters
can be attributed to the realization of scale economies.
One might object to an interpretation of scale economies realized by exporters as a pro-
ductivity advantage. A more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the production technology should allow
scale economies to vary by plant size. This is the case for a translog production function.
Estimation results are in the third column of Table 6. Country-speciﬁc quadratic and in-
25teraction terms are included, but not reported. Inputs are normalized by country to have
mean zero, which gives the linear coeﬃcients the same interpretation as for the Cobb-Douglas
technology. Average scale economies for the sample are still estimated to be increasing, at
1.13, but evaluating the function separately for the average exporter and nonexporter shows a
clear diﬀerence. Returns to scale are estimated higher for nonexporters, 1.17 versus 1.08, and
the diﬀerence is statistically diﬀerent at a 1% signiﬁcance level. Exporters choose to operate
higher up on the production frontier, where remaining scale economies are diminished.
One could go one step further and argue that the two groups of plants do not operate
with the same technology. Exporters diﬀer in many respects from nonexporters. They have
a higher capital-labor ratio, invest more frequent, have higher value added as a percentage of
sales, introduce new technology more frequent, and are more likely to have a formal training
program for employees.24 Adoption of production technology could provide another channel
for exporters in developing countries to improve productivity. For example, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1997) built a model where countries copy new technologies from more advanced
trading partners, leading to convergence in income between countries.
I estimate the production function separately for exporters and nonexporters and test for
a structural break in the sample between the two categories. The last two columns of Table
6 contain these results. Exporters do not only diﬀer from nonexporters in productivity level,
but also in input elasticities, or returns to scale. Returns to scale are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one for exporters, indicating that these ﬁrms have exhausted all scale economies. Non-
exporters, on the other hand, produce at a point on the production function with signiﬁcantly
increasing returns to scale. Allowing diﬀerent coeﬃcients in the production function highlights
the diﬀerences between the two groups of plants. It conﬁrms the higher capital intensity (the
24See Van Biesebroeck (2002) for evidence from the same data set.
26capital coeﬃcient is 27% of the sum of both inputs, versus 17% for nonexporters) and pro-
ductivity growth (+12% versus -2%) for exporters. The Chow test for structural break, which
assumes equal variation of the residual for both types, decidedly rejects that exporters and
nonexporters share the same technology. The χ2-distributed test statistic is 2.86, while the
critical value for a 1% signiﬁcance level is 1.94. The Wald test, which allows for diﬀerent
variations, conﬁrms this result. The F-statistic is 22.08, while the 1% critical value is 13.28.25
5.2 Trade credit and contract defaults
The results in Section 3 revealed that exporters are substantially larger and that their size
advantage was largely established while exporting, not before entry on the export market.
Many of the ﬁrms in the sample report to be operating at a lower scale than they would like.
When asked directly, 16% of the owners or managers mention that insuﬃcient demand is the
principal limit to expansion, second only to credit availability. Almost a third of the owners
lists it as one of the three most important problems. It is a particularly acute problem for
the group of smallest enterprises if they do not export, while small exporters hardly mention
it.26 The largest problem by far, for these ﬁrms, is the limited availability of formal credit, see
the ﬁrst line in Table 7. Domestically oriented ﬁrms are more likely to report being growth
and/or credit constraint.27
Some evidence indicates that both problems are related. In order to increase sales, ﬁrms of-
ten extend trade credit to their clients. The statistics in Table 7 list the outstanding amounts
25Interestingly, if the sample is similarly split between large (more than 100 employees) and small ﬁrms, the
only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is the estimated returns too scale, while the relative importance of capital and labor
as well as the average productivity growth are nearly identical.
26Lack of demand is one of the main problems for 34% of nonexporters that employ less than 50 workers,
against only 10% for similarly-sized exporters.
27In contrast, the third most important problem, inappropriate infrastructure, is equally important for ﬁrms
of diﬀerent size and independent of export orientation.
27of credit at the time of interview as a percentage of total sales. Exporters, especially smaller
ones, award substantially more trade credit and also receive slightly more. For formal credit,
the big distinction is between small and large ﬁrms, while export status hardly matters. To
underscore the importance of trade credit, I list the importance of various forms of credit
as percentage of sales, as well as the (weighted) average credit period, in Table B.3 in the
Appendix. While the total amount of trade credit is of the same order of magnitude as the
amount of formal credit, it turns over much more rapidly. The risks involved are correspond-
ingly greater.
More than 75% of all ﬁrms give trade credit, but the diﬃculty enforcing contracts in Africa
makes this a particularly risky expansion strategy. Payments are often late, leading to disputes
and renegotiations.28 Almost two thirds of all ﬁrms report having had late or nonpayment
problems with domestic clients in the last year. The large number of problems reported,
between 4 and 12 a year on average, make clear that it is a widespread phenomena. Sales to
foreign ﬁrms, on the other hand, are signiﬁcantly less likely to lead to disputes. Exporters
report that only 8% of all client related payment problems are with foreign ﬁrms, even though
they make up more than 30% of the sales in the sample.29 When a problem with a foreign
ﬁrm arises it is three out of four times the ﬁrst, and possible also the last, business contact.
In contrast, when payment problems arise with domestic ﬁrms, the two ﬁrms already had
an established business relationship in ﬁve out of six cases. It is not surprising then that
exporters extend trade credit more easily to their clients. Most importantly, small exporters
use trade credit liberally, aiding expansion and realizing scale economies. A bill of lading is
one institution that facilitates this practice by exporters. Once the goods are shipped oﬀ to
28See Bigsten et al. (2000b).
29Statistically, payment by foreign ﬁrms turns out to be as reliable as payment by family members.
28the client, the seller’s bank arranges payment directly with the buyer’s bank, taking over the
exporter’s contract risk.
One can wonder to what extent these contractual considerations weaken the self-selection
or learning eﬀects, by reducing the correlation between productivity and export status. To
address this explicitly, I reestimate the model with production function and export participa-
tion decision from Section 4.2, including three extra lagged variables as determinants of the
export decision.30 Results for a limited number of coeﬃcients are in the “endogenous export
participation” columns of Table 8. Firms are slightly more likely to start exporting if one or
two years ago they experienced contractual problems with clients, reported to be constraint
by lack of demand, or extended a lot of trade credit. The contractual variables are estimated
imprecisely, especially in the equation with only one export lag. With two lags, all variables
enter with positive sign, as expected, albeit still not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
eﬀect of lagged export status is slightly reduced, but still large and positive. The coeﬃcient
drops only slightly from 0.35 to 0.29, when only one export lag is included. There seems
to be some selection into the export market based on these ”problem” variables, but not a
strong eﬀect. The self-selection eﬀect based on unobserved productivity remains robust after
controlling for contractual problems.
Because exporting helps ﬁrms to realize scale economies, there is an eﬀect over and beyond
the self-selection. They might start exporting to reduce their exposure to client defaults, but
the higher scale of operation will show up as productivity gains if returns to scale are constant
across ﬁrms or if exporters produce at a diﬀerent point on the same production frontier, as
the translog estimates in the third column of Table 6 suggest. If exporters operate with a
30The contractual problem variables are only available in the ﬁrst year. Therefore, I limit the sample to
ﬁrms that participated in the ﬁrst wave.
29diﬀerent technology, self-selection can have further beneﬁcial eﬀects of inducing ﬁrms to adopt
a technology with higher productivity growth.
Assuming that exporting solves the contractual, lack of demand, and excessive trade credit
problem, one can verify whether ﬁrms that start exporting for exogenous reasons also suﬀered
from the same contractual problems. If this is the case, some of the eﬀects attributed to
learning-by-exporting may fundamentally come from foreign sales solving domestic contracting
problems, rather than shifting out the (technological) production frontier. A two step approach
addresses this question. First, export status is predicted using the exogenous variables from
the GMM and MLE approaches in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, including country and industry
dummies. This isolates the exogenous tendency for ﬁrms to start exporting and abstract from
any self-selection eﬀects. In the second stage, the predicted export probability is regressed
on the three contractual variables. If these coeﬃcients have positive signs, it means that
ﬁrms that started exporting for exogenous reasons, the very ﬁrms that drive identiﬁcation of
the learning-by-exporting eﬀects in the GMM and MLE approaches, suﬀered from the three
contractual problems. If exporting adequately solves those, the learning eﬀects might simply
pick up the resolution of the contractual problems.
Results in the last two columns of Table 8 conﬁrm that previous contractual problems,
lack of demand, or large trade credit given, are positively related to future export status.31
At least some of the learning eﬀects might indicate resolution of contractual problems, rather
than higher production eﬃciency.
31The usual procedure in a cross-section would be to run the reverse regressions and see whether contract
problems and the two other variables can be predicted by the exogenous component of the export status.
Running these separate regressions also yielded positive coeﬃcients. I do not report these results as they
involve predicting past variables using future behavior, which are hard to interpret.
306 Conclusions
Exporters of manufacturers in sub-Saharan Africa have a higher level of productivity than non-
exporters. This replicates similar ﬁndings for a number of other countries. In contrast with
the other studies, the productivity gap in Africa cannot solely be attributed to self-selection
of more productive ﬁrms into the export market. Exporters increase their productivity ad-
vantage after they start exporting. They not only have a higher productivity level, but also
a higher rate of productivity growth. The productivity advantage for exporters remains after
controlling for the endogeneity of the export decision using instrumental variables or explicitly
estimating the export participation decision jointly with the production function. A fourth
semiparametric method that controls in addition for sample selection supports the same con-
clusion. All of this points to the presence of some learning-by-exporting eﬀects.
To explain the productivity gap, returns to scale are particularly important. Exporters have
exhausted scale economies, while nonexporters are producing at a point on the production
function with signiﬁcant increasing returns to scale. I can reject the hypothesis that both types
of ﬁrms produce with the same technology, which is consistent with the acquisition of more
advanced technologies by exporters from interacting with foreign clients and competitors. In
particular, exporting can solve the perceived lack of demand that many ﬁrms face. Domestic
expansion is limited by the lack of formal. The higher risks associated with trade credit—
accounts-collectable problems with domestic ﬁrms are widespread—makes extending credit to
clients a risky expansion strategy. Exporting can provide a solution by providing access to
a more reliable client base and through the speciﬁc institutions that deal with credit risks
associated with foreign trade. This eﬀect has not been documented before and warrants
further investigation.
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33Figure 1: The pattern for the evolution of diﬀerence between several characteristics.
not exporting   exporting spell   not exporting
sales (S) continuous exporter
employment (L)
newly entered





(S/L or VA/L)  newly entered continuous exporter
wages 








investment/worker about to quit
(I/L) pre-export (only K/L)
post-export
  about to quit (only I/L)
never exporting (benchmark) (only I/L)
time
34Table 1: Export status is correlated with productivity level
Correlation between LP and ... unit of number of partial (p-value)
observation observations correlation
aggregate export sharea country 9 0.434 (0.244)
export share in manufacturing country 7 0.523 (0.229)
export share by (country-)industry industry 92 0.356 (0.001)
export participation plantb 3772 0.256 (0.000)
value of exports for exporters plantb 1054 0.293 (0.000)
Source: World Bank (2000);
a GDP/capita (instead of LP); b Excludes plants in the highest and lowest productivity percentile.
Table 2: OLS regressions of plant characteristics on export status
sub-Saharan Africa United States Germany Colombia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average wage (W
L ) 0.341∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.017 0.173∗∗
Production wage -0.016 0.074∗∗ -0.018 0.112∗∗
Nonproduction wage 0.288∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.141∗∗
Shipments per worker (S
L) 0.527∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.463∗∗
Value added per worker (V A
L ) 0.560∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.461∗∗
Capital per worker (K
L) 0.501∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.486∗∗
Investment per worker ( I
L) 0.498∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.481∗∗
Nonproduction/total workers 0.006 0.124∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.044∗∗
Shipments (S) 3.124∗∗ 1.100∗∗ 0.957∗∗ 1.237∗∗
Employment (L) 2.126∗∗ 0.936∗∗ 0.717∗∗ 1.972∗∗
Number of observations (max) 3,800 190,000 4,200 70,000
(1) Statistics are the coeﬃcient estimates of an export dummy in a plant-level regression, controlling for
country-years, industry, location and log employment (except in shipment and employment regressions).
(2) Bernard and Jensen (1995) Table 7; (3) Bernard and Wagner (1997) Table 3; (4) Isgut (2001) Table 5.
∗ and ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 1 percent signiﬁcance level.











Ever an exporter -0.022 0.058 0.102∗ 0.016 0.037 0.064 0.016
Current exporter 0.007 0.098∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.108 0.075 0.114∗∗ 0.040∗
Current exporter -0.003 0.092∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.085 0.061 0.105∗∗ 0.035∗
Future or past exporter -0.085 -0.054 -0.096 -0.207∗ -0.094 -0.072 -0.046
Observations 1754 1933 1933 1933 603 1933 1933
Regressions as in Table 2, with growth rates as dependent variables, controlling for employment
growth in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns. The ﬁrst two rows are separate regressions, while in the last two rows,
both dummies are included together. **: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, *: at the 5% level.
Table 4: Exporters are more productive
All observations Interviewed twice or more Three interviews
(nine countries) (seven countries) (six countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current export status 0.281 0.618 0.373 0.618
(.056) (.095) (.075) (.115)




Newly entered 0.552 0.574
(.119) (.125)




Labor (average) 0.925 0.894 0.900 0.871 0.913 0.970
(.069) (.070) (.079) (.079) (.079) (.075)
Capital (average) 0.170 0.167 0.223 0.220 0.228 0.177
(.037) (.037) (.043) (.043) (.043) (.038)
Observations 3851 3851 3170 3170 1935 1410
Firms 1922 1922 1230 1230 1230 705
R2 0.842 0.842 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.832
Cobb-Douglas production function estimated with random eﬀects, allowing for country-speciﬁc
input coeﬃcients. Country-year, industry, and location dummies are included as controls.
36Table 5: Production function estimates, controlling for self-selection and unobserved produc-
tivity.
GMM MLE SP GMM MLE SP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3)
Labor (average) 1.067 0.246 0.729 0.212 0.255 0.782
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.08)
Capital (average) 0.054 0.026 0.095 0.033 0.036 0.018
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07)
qjt−1 0.611 0.351 0.613 0.735
(0.06) (0.03) (0.21) (0.03)
qjt−2 -0.011 0.447
(0.02) (0.04)
EXjt−1 0.285 0.379 0.196 0.255 0.210 0.211
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.26) (0.17) (0.18)
EXjt−2 -0.014 0.334 0.026
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
Observations 705 1930 1935 705 705 705
For all tests the p-values are reported:
H0: EXt−i = 0, ∀i 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.25
H0: EXt−i exogenous 0.04 0.05
Sargan test 0.01 0.20
Production function (1) estimated by (1) GMM system estimator enforcing constraints;
(4) GMM-SYS not enforcing constraints, see Section 4.1; (2) Maximum likelihood, see Section 4.2;
(3) Semiparametric three-step estimator, see Section 4.3.
37Table 6: Testing for diﬀerences in technology and scale economies.
all ﬁrms all ﬁrms exporter nonexporter
CD-VRS CD-CRS Translog-VRS Translog-VRS
EXt−1 0.219 0.451 0.195
(.074) (.068) (.074)
Labor (average) 0.913 0.750 0.898 0.738 0.969
(.079) — (.084) (.202) (.116)
Capital (average) 0.228 0.250 0.236 0.270 0.202
(.043) (.042) (.046) (.115) (.063)
Time trend (average) -0.010 -0.025 -0.002 0.121 -0.019
(.076) (.078) (.076) (.221) (.017)
Quadratic terms No No Yes Yes Yes
RTS for exporters 1.14 1.00 1.08 1.01
RTS for nonexporters 1.14 1.00 1.17 1.17
Number of observations 1933 1933 1933 499 1434
Estimation is with random eﬀects as in Table 4 with country, industry, and location dummies.
Both the linear and quadratic (not reported) coeﬃcients on inputs and time vary by country.
Table 7: Contracts and credit.
exporters nonexporters
smalla large small large
One of main problems is lack of credit 0.51 0.39 0.58 0.41
One of main problems is lack of demand 0.19 0.26 0.30 0.28
One of main problems is infrastructure 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16
(Number of ﬁrms) (204) (696) (2394) (557)
Trade credit received 0.103 0.181 0.080 0.085
Trade credit given 0.677 0.180 0.144 0.108
Formal loans received 0.126 0.203 0.143 0.218
(Number of ﬁrms) (366) (534) (2676) (275)
Late or non-payment by a clientb 0.664 0.657 0.587 0.657
Number of non-payments (if any)b 5 12 4 6
Last problem was with a foreign client 0.082 0.086
(Number of ﬁrms) (135) (210) (1147) (134)
a The small ﬁrm-large ﬁrm sample split is at 100 employees. b in last year, excluding foreign clients.
38Table 8: Eﬀect of contractual problems on export status.
Endogenous export participationa Exogenous exportersb





(Contractual variables) (t − 1) (t − 2) (t − 1) (t − 2)
Contract problem? -0.150 0.047 0.023 0.052
(.236) (.220) (.011) (.010)
Lack of demand? -0.054 0.195 0.029 0.025
(.181) (.191) (.012) (.010)
Trade credit given (log) 0.484 0.262 0.028 0.020
(.540) (.276) (.016) (.013)
Number of observations 862 692 862 692
a Export participation jointly estimated with the production function using MLE, as in (2) and (5) of
Table 5 and Table B.2, adding the three contractual variables. (Other variables hardly changed and
are not reported)
b In a ﬁrst stage (not reported), export status is predicted using the same instruments as in Table 5.
In the second stage (results reported), the predicted probability of exporting is regressed on the three
variables of interest.
39Appendix A: Summary statistics
Table A.1: Summary statistics for the nine sub-Saharan countries (1995)
GDP per capita VA per employee manuf. share export share
(PPP) in industry (USD)b in GDP in manuf. EXm
EXtot
c
Ethiopia 446 1690 0.07 0.23a 0.30c
Tanzania 485 983 0.07 0.21 0.16
Burundi 759 2450 0.13 0.06 0.09
Zambia 936 5507 0.10 0.20 0.08
Kenya 1112 1704 0.09 0.32 0.16
Ghana 1511 1089 0.06 0.20d 0.30e
Cote d’Ivoire 1588 5915 0.16 0.60 0.36
Cameroon 1755 7904 0.10 0.21 0.14
Zimbabwe 2195 7042 0.19 0.45 0.37
Source: World Bank (2000), a UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1992
Notes: b Industry comprises manufacturing, mining, and utilities;
c Share of manufactured goods in total exports; d in GDP; e 1997
Table A.2: Summary statistics for the sample of manufacturing plants
years # of # of coverage LP
plants observations of GDPa (USD)
Ethiopia 1996 207 207 0.79 5493
Tanzania 1992, 1993, 1994 241 485 0.31 3057
Burundi 1993 105 105 0.65 6169
Zambia 1992, 1993, 1994 262 532 0.12 5689
Kenya 1992, 1992, 1994 267 609 0.17 5993
Ghana 1991, 1992, 1993 209 497 0.14 3845
Cote d’Ivoire 1994, 1995 188 303 0.52 10930
Cameroon 1992, 1993, 1994 234 557 0.63 9627
Zimbabwe 1992, 1993, 1994 203 556 0.26 7618
Notes: a Total value added in the ﬁrst interview year as a percentage of manufacturing GDP.
Table A.3: Trade statistics for the sample of manufacturing plants
export participation share of sales exported share exported overseasb
all ﬁrms large ﬁrms unweighted weighteda unweighted weighteda
Ethiopia 0.02 0.15 0.40 0.60
Tanzania 0.09 0.60 0.24 0.27 0.43 0.82
Burundi 0.17 1.00 0.28 0.37
Zambia 0.09 0.48 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.38
Kenya 0.22 0.68 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.26
Ghana 0.11 0.30 0.31 0.21 0.54 0.20
Cote d’Ivoire 0.44 0.87 0.54 0.49 0.53 0.57
Cameroon 0.28 0.94 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.41
Zimbabwe 0.49 0.86 0.20 0.17 0.27 0.22
Notes: a sales weighted, b of total exports
40Appendix B: Additional tables











pre-entry 0.303 0.564 0.605 0.287 0.232 2.153 1.313
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.12)
newly entered 0.364 0.617 0.675 0.623 0.800 2.277 1.377
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) (0.13)
continuous exporter 0.390 0.608 0.632 0.557 0.531 3.631 2.494
(CE) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06)
about to quit 0.323 0.379 0.408 0.544 0.006 1.947 1.301
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.33) (0.21) (0.14)
post-exit 0.284 0.367 0.282 0.691 0.296 1.865 1.239
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.30) (0.20) (0.14)
H0: CE = pre 0.40 0.71 0.84 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.00
H0: CE = post 0.34 0.06 0.01 0.49 0.45 0.00 0.00
H0: CE = pre = post 0.47 0.16 0.04 0.22 0.43 0.00 0.00
H0: CE = new = quit 0.82 0.22 0.28 0.92 0.17 0.00 0.00
H0: new = pre 0.65 0.73 0.68 0.14 0.11 0.59 0.68
H0: quit = post 0.80 0.94 0.50 0.57 0.51 0.74 0.72
Similar regressions as in Table 2, with more detail on export status.
Statistics for the hypothesis tests are p-values for two sided tests.
I illustrate with the ﬁrst column how to read Table B.1. Continuous exporters pay 39%
higher salaries than perennial nonexporters, which is statistically signiﬁcant as the t-statistic is
6.5
(= 0.39/0.06). In fact, the diﬀerence between all groups of plants and nonexporters are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Plants that start exporting during the sample period already
paid 30% higher salaries before they actually sold anything abroad, which rises to 36% after
exporting starts. The diﬀerence between current exporters and plants that will only start
exporting later is not signiﬁcant, as the p-value for the test (H0: CE = pre) is 0.40. The
diﬀerence pre and post export market entry is also not signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.65.
Even after exporters exit from the export market they keep paying higher salaries than non-
exporters, 28% higher, which is lower but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from their competitors
that remained active in the export market (the p-value is 0.34). The wage gap with nonex-
porters declines slightly, to 32%, prior to exit from the export market, again an insigniﬁcant
diﬀerence. Testing whether continuous exporters are diﬀerent from nonexporters that will
enter the export market later or have just quit (H0: CE = pre = post) or from exporters that
have just started or will shortly seize (H0: CE = new = quit), gives negative answers with
respective p-values of 0.80 and 0.65.
41Table B.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of export participation decision
Dependent variable: exporter=1, nonexporter=0
capital city 0.168 -0.251
(0.57) (0.61)
state owner 0.097 -0.654
(1.20) (1.03)
ethnic owner 0.233 0.718
(0.68) (0.59)
foreign owner 1.312 1.693
(0.62) (0.57)








H0: EXt−τ = 0, ∀τ 0.00 0.01
H0: ˜ qt−τ = 0, ∀τ 0.18 0.05
Jointly estimated with production function, columns SP in Table 5.
Table B.3: Importance of trade credit.
amount outstanding total credit period (days)
(as % of sales) averagea median
Net trade credit 0.103
Net with suppliers 0.160 6.4 1
Net with clients -0.057 9.7 2
Gross trade credit 0.296
Gross credit extended 0.200 9.8 2
Gross credit received 0.097 5.9 1
Formal credit 0.384
Loans 0.155 1970 1080
Overdrafts 0.229
Informal loans 0.015 315 60
Informal borrowing 0.005 153 60
a weighted by credit amount
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